Should Cyber Exploitation Ever Constitute a Demonstration of Hostile Intent That May Violate UN Charter Provisions Prohibiting the Threat or Use of Force? by Wortham, Anna
Federal Communications Law
Journal
Volume 64 | Issue 3 Article 8
5-2012
Should Cyber Exploitation Ever Constitute a
Demonstration of Hostile Intent That May Violate
UN Charter Provisions Prohibiting the Threat or
Use of Force?
Anna Wortham
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Communications Law Commons, International Law
Commons, Internet Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and the National Security Law
Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Federal Communications Law Journal by an authorized
administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information,
please contact wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wortham, Anna (2012) "Should Cyber Exploitation Ever Constitute a Demonstration of Hostile Intent That May Violate UN Charter
Provisions Prohibiting the Threat or Use of Force?," Federal Communications Law Journal: Vol. 64: Iss. 3, Article 8.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj/vol64/iss3/8
 643 
Should Cyber Exploitation Ever 
Constitute a Demonstration of Hostile 
Intent That May Violate UN Charter 
Provisions Prohibiting the Threat or 
Use of Force? 
Anna Wortham* 
I.  INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 644	  
II.  CYBER ATTACK AND CYBER EXPLOITATION ........................... 646	  
A. 	   Difference Between Cyber Attacks and Cyber 
Exploitations Generally ................................................... 646	  
B. 	   Comparison of Cyber Attacks and Cyber Exploitations .. 646	  
III.  LOAC AND THE UN CHARTER ................................................. 647	  
A. 	   Laws That Apply to Cyber Attack and Cyber 
Exploitation Generally .................................................... 647	  
B. 	   The Law of Armed Conflict .............................................. 647	  
1. Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello ................................... 647	  
2. Specific Laws Governing Jus Ad Bellum .................... 648	  
IV.  DIFFICULTIES APPLYING LOAC AND UN CHARTER 
PROVISIONS .............................................................................. 650	  
                                                                                                             
*  J.D. Candidate, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, May 2013; B.A. in 
English, Brigham Young University, April 2010. The Author would like to thank the 
members of the Federal Communications Law Journal for their help preparing this Note for 
publication. In addition, the Author would like to thank her husband for believing in her and 
her parents for constantly encouraging her to do her best. 
644 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64 
A. 	   Physical Injury and Destruction vs. Infrastructure 
Controlled by Technology ............................................... 650	  
B. 	   Cyber Attack Weapons Are Readily Available, Not Just 
Available to Governments ............................................... 651	  
C.	    Presumption of Nation-to-Nation Conflict Between 
National Military Forces ................................................. 651	  
D. 	   The Interconnection of Military and Civilian 
Information Technology .................................................. 651	  
E. 	   The Exception for Espionage ........................................... 652	  
F. 	   The Problem of Attribution .............................................. 653	  
V.  CYBER EXPLOITATION AS A THREAT OR USE OF FORCE ......... 655	  
A. 	   Cyber Exploitation as a “Use of Force” Under Current 
Laws ................................................................................. 655	  
B. 	   Cyber Exploitation as a Threat of Force Under Current 
Laws ................................................................................. 655	  
C. 	   Cyber Exploitation and Anticipatory Self-Defense 
Under Current Laws ........................................................ 656	  
VI.  NEW LAWS FOR CYBER THREATS: CYBER EXPLOITATION AS 
ESPIONAGE? ............................................................................. 657	  
A. 	   Espionage Generally ....................................................... 657	  
B. 	   Differences Between Cyber Exploitation and 
Traditional Espionage ..................................................... 658	  
1. Access to Much Larger Breadth of Material ............... 658	  
2. Much Easier and Less Expensive Access .................... 659	  
3. Unknown Effects, Spread to Unintended Targets ....... 659	  
4. Attribution Is Near Impossible .................................... 659	  
5. Long Time to Investigate, Few Conclusive Answers .. 660	  
VII.  CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 660 
I. INTRODUCTION  
As the United States and other countries rely more and more on 
complex infrastructures that are primarily controlled by information 
technology, and cyber threats against nations become a reality, clear 
international laws on cyber threats become a necessity. In light of the fact 
that the United States and other nations may use cyber capabilities 
offensively as well as defensively, it is even more important that the laws 
for engaging in such cyber conflict are clear. This is especially true in the 
case of cyber exploitation because the effects of such exploitations can be 
far-reaching, but the international law regarding these exploitations is far 
from clear. Currently, it seems unlikely that cyber exploitation can ever be 
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regarded as a threat or use of force under the UN Charter because it is 
typically regarded as espionage, which is permissible internationally.  
This Note first analyzes whether it is the case that cyber exploitation 
cannot constitute a threat or use of force and then analyzes whether that 
should be the case. Section II focuses on cyber attack and cyber 
exploitation generally, explaining the differences between the two threats 
and the similarities in the ways the two threats are carried out. Section III 
discusses what body of law is applicable to cyber attack and cyber 
exploitation when a nation engages in or defends against one of these 
threats, specifically the Laws of Armed Conflict (“LOAC”) and the UN 
Charter. Section IV discusses some of the primary difficulties in applying 
LOAC and the UN Charter to cyber threats. Section V analyzes whether 
cyber exploitation, under current governing law, can ever constitute a use 
of force, constitute a threat of force, or justify anticipatory self-defense. 
This section concludes that cyber exploitation, by itself, likely cannot 
constitute a threat or use of force under current law. Section VI then 
analyzes whether cyber exploitation should continue to be treated similar to 
traditional espionage in the international setting, which would result in it 
never being considered a threat or use of force. This section argues that 
cyber exploitation should be treated differently than traditional espionage 
and lays out several reasons why this should be the case. Ultimately, this 
Note concludes that because cyber exploitation is so different from 
traditional espionage, cyber exploitation should be able to constitute a 
threat or use of force by itself in some cases. In situations where it does not 
rise to the level of threat or use of force, it should still be prohibited 
internationally because it can be so much more destructive than traditional 
espionage.  
While this Note primarily focuses on the questions surrounding cyber 
exploitation, the similarities between cyber attack and cyber exploitation 
make the discussion of cyber attack in this paper requisite. Because there 
has not been much written on the subject of cyber exploitation or cyber 
attacks and how they should be dealt with in an international “armed 
conflict” sense, the majority of the background information in this Note is 
founded on information presented in the 2009 National Research Council 
Report (“NRC Report”).1 
                                                                                                             
1.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING 
U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 1 (William A. Owens, Kenneth 
W. Dam & Herbert S. Lin eds., 2009) [hereinafter NRC REPORT]. 
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II. CYBER ATTACK AND CYBER EXPLOITATION 
A.  Difference Between Cyber Attacks and Cyber Exploitations 
Generally 
Cyber attacks and cyber exploitations are the two forms of hostile 
actions that may be taken against a computer system or network.2 While 
many people lump these two categories together under the title of cyber 
attacks, cyber attack and cyber exploitation are two distinct actions. 
According to the NRC Report, “[c]yber attack refers to deliberate actions to 
alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy computer systems or networks or 
the information and/or programs resident in or transiting these systems or 
networks.”3 The purpose of a cyber attack is to make adversary computer 
systems and networks less useful to the adversary by making them 
unavailable or untrustworthy.4 Cyber exploitation, on the other hand, refers 
to “the use of cyber offensive actions . . . usually for the purpose of 
obtaining information resident on or transiting through an adversary’s 
computer systems or networks.”5 The main difference between cyber attack 
and cyber exploitation is that cyber attack is destructive in nature while 
cyber exploitation is focused on intelligence gathering and, in order to be 
covert, purposely does not try to affect the normal processes of the 
computer or network exploited.  
B.  Comparison of Cyber Attacks and Cyber Exploitations 
With regard to operational considerations, cyber exploitation and 
cyber attack are very similar. Both cyber attack and cyber exploitation 
require a vulnerability, access to the vulnerability, and a payload to be 
executed.6 The payload to be executed, though, differs between the two. 
Cyber exploitation requires that the execution of the payload be 
accomplished clandestinely, while secrecy is often far less important with 
                                                                                                             
 2. Herbert S. Lin, Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force, 4 J. NAT’L 
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 63, 63 (2010). 
 3. NRC REPORT, supra note 1. The NRC Report states that “[a]n adversary computer 
or network may not necessarily be owned and operated by the adversary—it may simply 
support or be used by the adversary.” Id. at 11 n.4.  
 4. Id. at 11. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 20 (“For a computer or network, a vulnerability is an aspect of the system that 
can be used by the attacker to compromise [the system] . . . .”). Vulnerabilities can be 
introduced either intentionally or accidentally. Id. at 83. “Payload is the term used to 
describe the things that can be done once a vulnerability has been exploited.” Id. at 88. 
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cyber attacks because the effects of the cyber attack are often readily 
apparent to the target.7  
The process of intelligence gathering necessary to penetrate an 
adversary’s computer or network is almost identical for both cyber 
exploitation and cyber attack.8 Both cyber attack and cyber exploitation use 
the same kind of access paths to reach their targets and also “take 
advantage of the same vulnerabilities to deliver their payloads.”9 Because 
of the aforementioned similarities, an adversary’s intent is often extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to determine.10 This topic will be revisited later 
in this Note.   
III. LOAC AND THE UN CHARTER 
A.  Laws That Apply to Cyber Attack and Cyber Exploitation 
Generally 
The rules that apply when a nation engages in or defends against a 
cyber attack or cyber exploitation are not entirely clear. Although cyber-
specific rules have been created in many instances for cybercrime, nations 
have not created cyber-specific rules for the actions they take against other 
nations.11 Therefore, most international laws have to be applied by analogy. 
The main body of relevant international laws, and the body of laws most 
pertinent for the discussion of this Note, is the LOAC.  
B.  The Law of Armed Conflict 
 1. Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello 
LOAC addresses two questions: (1) “[W]hen is it legal for a nation to 
use force against another nation?” and (2) “[W]hat are the rules that govern 
the behavior of combatants who are engaged in armed conflict?”12 The law 
governing when a nation can use force against another nation is known as 
jus ad bellum.13 Jus ad bellum refers to “those established ‘conflict 
management’ norms and procedures that dictate when a state may—and 
                                                                                                             
 7. Id. at 20–21. 
 8. Id. at 155. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id.  
 11. Duncan B. Hollis, An e-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373, 393 (2011). 
 12. NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 242. 
 13. Id. 
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may not—legitimately use force as an instrument of dispute resolution.”14 
The law governing when nations are involved in armed conflict, which is 
separate and distinct from jus ad bellum, is known as jus in bello.15 
Because this Note focuses on whether or not cyber exploitations can ever 
constitute a “threat or use of force” that would permit a targeted nation to 
retaliate, jus ad bellum is the relevant body of law.  
 2. Specific Laws Governing Jus Ad Bellum 
According to the NRC Report, “[j]us ad bellum is governed by the UN 
Charter, interpretations of the UN Charter, and some customary 
international law that has developed in connection with and sometimes 
prior to the UN Charter.”16 Jus ad bellum and the UN Charter specifically 
apply to covert action such as cyber exploitation.17 The UN Charter 
provisions most applicable to jus ad bellum are Articles 2(4), 39, 41, 42, 
and 51.18 
The aforementioned articles of the UN Charter lay out the basic 
framework of jus ad bellum. Article 2(4) sets forth the prohibition against 
the threat or use of force.19 Specifically, Article 2(4) prohibits every nation 
from using “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations.”20 Professor Wingfield of the U.S. 
Army Command and General Staff College testified to the committee 
putting together the NRC Report that some threats that might constitute 
“threats of force” according to Article 2(4) include “verbal threats, initial 
troop movements, initial movement of ballistic missiles, massing of troops 
on a border, use of fire control radars, and interference with early warning 
or command and control systems.”21 
Articles 39, 41, and 42 define the Security Council’s authority. Article 
39 gives the Security Council the authority to “determine the existence of 
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and [to] 
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in 
                                                                                                             
 14. David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & 
POL’Y 87 (2010) (citing John Norton Moore, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 29 (John Norton 
Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., 2d ed. 2005). 
 15. NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 242.  
 16. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 17. Id.   
 18. See Graham, supra note 14, at 88; Lin, supra note 2, at 71; NRC REPORT, supra 
note 1, at 257. 
 19. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 20. Id. 
 21. NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 242. 
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accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.”22 In Article 41, the Security Council is given the 
authority to “decide what measures not involving the use of armed force 
are to be employed to give effect to its decisions . . . .”23 In Article 42, the 
Security Council is given the authority to take “such action by air, sea, or 
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace 
and security” if it decides “measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate . . . .”24  
Despite all the aforementioned provisions of the UN Charter, Article 
51 states that “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has 
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”25 
Article 51 provides an exception to the absolute prohibition against the use 
of force put forth in Article 2(4), permitting nations to use force out of self-
defense. Whether Article 51 recognizes a pre-existent right to self-defense 
or limits that right of self-defense is presently being debated.26 
The only other exception to the absolute prohibition against the use of 
force is that set forth in Article 39, which states that nations are allowed to 
use force if given permission by the Security Council.27 Articles 39 and 42, 
together, allow the Security Council to authorize uses of force.28 An 
important note is that a nation does not need Security Council permission 
in order to act in self-defense as permitted by Article 51.29  
In some instances, nations are allowed to act out of “anticipatory self-
defense” before an attack has even been launched.30 Although this right is 
not explicitly stated in Article 51, when a nation is facing an unambiguous 
attack, it is widely accepted that the interpretation of Article 51 allows a 
nation to act out of self-defense prior to the attack.31 This right of 
anticipatory self-defense is explained in Oppenheim’s International Law, 
where it states: 
[T]he use of armed force and the violation of another state’s territory, 
can be justified as self-defence under international law where: (a) an 
                                                                                                             
 22. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
 23. Id. at art. 41. 
 24. Id. at art. 42. 
 25. Id. at art. 51. 
 26. NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 243. 
 27. Graham, supra note 14, at 88; U.N. Charter arts. 39, 51. 
 28. U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42; Lin, supra note 2, at 71. 
 29. NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 243. See U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 30. NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 243. 
 31. U.N. Charter art. 51; NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 243. 
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armed attack is launched, or is immediately threatened, against a state’s 
territory or forces . . . (b) there is an urgent necessity for defensive 
action against that attack; (c) there is no practicable alternative to 
action in self-defence, . . . [and] (d) the action taken by way of self-
defence is limited to what is necessary to stop or  prevent the 
infringement . . . .32 
When a nation can use anticipatory self-defense, though, is not clear. Often, 
the “threatened party is likely to have a rather different perception of such 
facts and circumstances than the threatening state.”33 The NRC Report 
explains:  
The mere fact that Zendia possesses destructive capabilities that could 
be used against Ruritania cannot be sufficient to indicate imminent 
attack—otherwise, the mere existence of armed forces of an adversary 
would be sufficient justification. But if Zendia can use these 
capabilities effectively against Ruritania and with serious 
consequences without warning, and Zendia has indicated hostile intent 
toward Ruritania in other (perhaps nonmilitary) ways, outside 
observers may indeed be more likely to judge that the conditions for 
anticipatory self-defense have been met.34  
IV. DIFFICULTIES APPLYING LOAC AND UN CHARTER 
PROVISIONS 
What specifically counts as a threat or use of force under Article 2(4) 
in a cyber context? Because of the technology used in cyber attacks and 
cyber exploitations, it is very difficult to actually apply LOAC and UN 
Charter provisions. Oftentimes, the only way to apply LOAC and UN 
Charter provisions is through analogy. Below, this Note discusses some of 
the main reasons that applying LOAC and UN Charter provisions to cyber 
attacks and cyber exploitations is difficult.  
A.  Physical Injury and Destruction vs. Infrastructure Controlled by 
Technology 
Much of society today relies on an infrastructure that is controlled in 
large part by information technology. Interference with that infrastructure, 
regardless of whether physical damage is caused, can constitute an armed 
attack under Article 51.35 In order to determine if a cyber attack or 
exploitation should constitute a threat or use of force, the effects of the 
attack or exploitation are the most important aspect of the threats to 
                                                                                                             
 32. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 422 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th 
ed. 1992). 
 33. NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 243. 
 34. Id. at 243, 246. 
 35. Id. at 254.  
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analyze.36 If the effects produced by a cyber threat would constitute a use 
of force if produced by other means under LOAC and the UN Charter, then 
the threat will likely constitute a use of force.37 The opposite is also true.38 
B.  Cyber Attack Weapons Are Readily Available, Not Just 
Available to Governments 
The technology needed to launch a cyber attack or exploitation is 
widely available today. Nonstate actors can launch cyber attacks and 
exploitations quite easily and can often do just as much harm as state 
actors.39 The inability to know whether an actor is a state actor or not 
makes applying LOAC and the UN Charter difficult because these laws are 
built upon the presumption that it is clear when LOAC should be applied 
and when national criminal laws should be applied.40 
C.  Presumption of Nation-to-Nation Conflict Between National 
Military Forces 
Closely related to the last difficulty discussed, LOAC and UN Charter 
provisions assume that the actors are nations and that national military 
forces are involved in the conflict.41 LOAC and UN Charter provisions are 
much harder to apply when nonstate actors must be taken into 
consideration.42  
D.  The Interconnection of Military and Civilian Information 
Technology 
Furthermore, today military and civilian information technology is 
interconnected.43 The “LOAC and UN Charter [are] based on the idea that 
civilian and military assets can be separated . . . .”44 Because this is not the 
case in the cyber realm, directly applying LOAC and UN Charter 
provisions is extremely difficult. 
                                                                                                             
 36.  See Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in 
International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885 
(1999); Jason Barkham, Information Warfare and International Law on the Use of Force, 
34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 57 (2001). 
 37. NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 272. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 22. 
 40.  Id. 
41.   Id. at 273.  
42.   Id. at 273–74. 
 43. Id. at 35. 
 44. Id. 
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E.  The Exception for Espionage 
The LOAC also assumes that espionage and the use of force are two 
distinct actions.45 In the cyber realm, however, this is often not the case. 
This is an incredibly important point because espionage and uses of force 
are treated very differently. Espionage is not deemed an illegal activity 
under international law,46 as “there are no treaties or customary norms that 
explicitly proscribe the practice.”47 According to Hays Parks: 
Each nation endeavors to deny intelligence gathering within its 
territory through domestic laws . . . . Prosecution under domestic law 
(or the threat thereof) constitutes a form of denial of information rather 
than the assertion of a per se violation of international law; domestic 
laws are promulgated in such a way as to deny foreign intelligence 
collection efforts within a nation's territory without inhibiting that 
nation's efforts to collect intelligence about other nations. No serious 
proposal has ever been made within the international community to 
prohibit intelligence collection as a violation of international law 
because of the tacit acknowledgement by nations that it is important to 
all, and practiced by each.48 
Nations seem to agree that espionage, among other activities, is not 
enough to count as a use of force.49 And many nations recognize cyber 
exploitation as a new method of espionage.50 As stated in the NRC Report, 
if the legal approach set forth by Hays Parks is accepted, cyber 
exploitations, which are generally thought of as espionage conducted 
through a computer, would be permissible under LOAC.51 And this could 
be the case even if the cyber exploitation is conducted in a manner that 
could also aid a destructive cyber attack.52  
 Because there are so many similarities between cyber attack and 
cyber exploitation, it is often difficult to determine whether a party has 
been exploited or attacked.53 Vulnerabilities in many cases can be used for 
either cyber attack, cyber exploitation, or both.54 While cyber exploitations 
                                                                                                             
 45. Id. at 22. 
 46. Id. at 259. 
 47. Robert D. Williams, (Spy) Game Change: Cyber Networks, Intelligence Collection, 
and Covert Action, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1162, 1165 (2011). 
 48. Lin, supra note 2, at 72 (quoting W. Hays Parks, The International Law of 
Intelligence Collection, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 433, 433–34 (John Norton Moore et al. 
eds., 1990)). 
 49. NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 242. 
 50. Hollis, supra note 11, at 395. See Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in from 
the Cold War: Intelligence and International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1071, 1072 (2006). 
 51. NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 261. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Hollis, supra note 11, at 386. 
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are not typically considered capable of being deemed a use of force, their 
similarities to cyber attacks often make it difficult to tell the two types of 
actions apart. 
Even when an action is limited exclusively to cyber exploitation, the 
potential to use that same vulnerability for a later cyber attack is still 
present.55 So when do these actions in the cyber context cross the line and 
count as threats or uses of force? If someone threatens to use an existing 
vulnerability in an adversary computer system or network, does that 
constitute a threat of force under the UN Charter?56 What about simply 
introducing vulnerabilities into an adversary’s system or network?57 Do 
those vulnerabilities have to be used within a certain time period for the 
threat to be real? Does there have to be evidence of an imminent attack or 
use of the vulnerability first before it can constitute a threat of force? Does 
finding a vulnerability alone justify using anticipatory self-defense? These 
are just some of the questions that analysts and policy makers are 
confronted with in the cyber realm. 
Furthermore, the cost to equip a cyber exploitation with the capability 
of a later cyber attack is extremely low, and it often makes sense to add 
such capabilities, whether or not those capabilities will ever be realized.58 
Because of the ease with which a cyber exploitation can be outfitted to 
conduct a cyber attack and the fact that these two cyber threats do not have 
to be mutually exclusive, a targeted party oftentimes will not know, and 
will have no way of finding out, whether it has been attacked, exploited, or 
both. This problem is further compounded because of the time constraints 
that often exist when dealing with and making decisions regarding such 
national threats.59  
F.  The Problem of Attribution  
Discussed briefly above, another difficulty in applying LOAC and the 
UN Charter stems from the problem of attribution inherent to cyber 
technology. Attribution refers to “the ability to identify the party 
responsible for an offensive cyber operation based only on technical 
indicators and information associated with that operation.”60 Both the 
                                                                                                             
 55. Id. 
 56. NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 257.  
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 152 n.60 (“If these [cyber exploitation] tools were to be used against U.S. 
citizens . . . legal and/or policy implications might arise if these tools were to have attack 
capabilities as well. Thus, the observation is most likely to be true for tools that are not 
intended for such use.”). 
 59. Id. at 273. 
 60. Lin, supra note 2, at 77. 
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LOAC and UN Charter assume that nations are necessarily involved and 
that those nations are either known or identifiable.61 However, the very 
makeup of the Internet makes attribution in many cases nearly 
impossible.62 While some level of attribution can be attained by acquiring 
information from nontechnical sources, such as human intelligence, it is 
often difficult to ascertain “when an offensive cyber operation has begun, 
who the attacker is, and what the operation’s purpose and effects are or 
were.”63 And in many cases with cyber attacks and cyber exploitations, the 
actor is never discovered. For example, the authors of the 2007 Estonia 
attacks, the 2008 Georgian attacks, the July 4, 2009 attacks, and the 
implanting of logic bombs in the U.S. power grid are still largely 
unknown.64  
The problem of attribution leads to many offshoot difficulties. One of 
those difficulties resulting from the problem of attribution is the issue of 
geography. When a nation has been the target of a cyber attack or 
exploitation, is it the computer’s physical location that is relevant when the 
nation is trying to determine what to attack in response, or is it some other 
geographic location?65  
Another difficulty resulting from the problem of attribution is 
knowing how to treat the action—should it be treated as a crime or an act 
of war?66 If the actor is a nation, then the problem should be treated as a 
national security issue rather than a law enforcement case.67 If the actor is 
misunderstood or misidentified, the wrong set of rules could easily be 
applied, though, and this could lead to the use of military force.68 
However, not knowing the actor does not mean that defensive actions 
are prohibited. According to the U.S. Defense Department, international 
law does not require that an actor must be known before defensive action 
can be taken.69 Rather, the responsibility for the attack would be imputed 
“to the state to whose territory the attack was traced.”70  
                                                                                                             
 61. See NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 293–94. 
 62. David D. Clark & Susan Landau, Untangling Attribution, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 
323, 345–46 (2011). 
 63. Lin, supra note 2, at 77. 
 64. Hollis, supra note 11, at 405. 
 65. See NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 36. 
 66. Hollis, supra note 11, at 405. 
 67. Clark & Landau, supra note 62, at 345. 
 68. Hollis, supra note 11, at 405. 
 69. Id. at 406.  
 70. Id. 
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V. CYBER EXPLOITATION AS A THREAT OR USE OF FORCE 
Given the issues previously discussed, can cyber exploitation ever 
constitute a “threat or use of force” under LOAC and the UN Charter? 
A.  Cyber Exploitation as a “Use of Force” Under Current Laws 
Under the current legal structure, cyber exploitation by itself seems to 
clearly never constitute a use of force. As stated above, most countries 
consider cyber exploitation a new form of espionage, and espionage 
traditionally does not constitute a use of force. While a cyber attack can 
constitute a use of force if the effects are such that they traditionally would 
have been achieved through a kinetic attack, cyber exploitation is regarded 
differently.  
However, as shown through the explanation of some of the difficulties 
in applying LOAC and UN Charter provisions to the cyber realm and the 
discussion of the similarities between cyber attack and exploitation, the 
distinctions between cyber attack and exploitation are not always clear. 
Because of the similarities between cyber attack and exploitation, targeted 
nations will typically not know what kind of cyber threat with which they 
are faced. When time constraints in responding to national threats are 
subsequently added to the already uncertain situation, it is easy to envision 
a nation misinterpreting a cyber threat and responding in a manner that 
would escalate the situation to armed conflict when in fact the situation had 
started out as a cyber exploitation. 
B.  Cyber Exploitation as a Threat of Force Under Current Laws 
While it seems pretty clear from the few articles and reports written 
on the subject that an isolated cyber exploitation will never by itself 
constitute a use of force, there is very little written on the question of 
whether a cyber exploitation can ever constitute a threat of force.71 Like a 
use of force, it would seem that the detection of an isolated cyber 
exploitation would also never constitute a threat of force for the same 
reasons. Traditionally, espionage simply cannot justify retaliation in the 
form of armed conflict.72 However, it is under the category of threat of 
force that there is much more ambiguity; the bar is lower in order for 
something to qualify as a threat of force.73 In order for a risk to constitute a 
“threat” of force, it is not requisite that there be any physical harm or 
readily evident destruction. There simply has to be a threat.  
                                                                                                             
71.  See generally NRC REPORT, supra note 1. 
72.  Espionage, in 4 WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 299 (1998). 
73.  See NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 257. 
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Because the same vulnerabilities can be used to perpetrate an attack, 
an exploitation, or both, if a nation identifies a vulnerability in a computer 
network that has been taken advantage of (or even simply that a 
vulnerability has been accessed in a manner that it can be taken advantage 
of easily at a later date), there is practically no way for that nation to tell 
what the intent of the attacking party was or is. When does identifying a 
vulnerability become a threat of force? Do some initial steps have to be 
taken to actually use the accessed vulnerability for a future attack? What if 
the vulnerability has already been taken advantage of for exploitation 
purposes over time? Can simply identifying the exploitation of information 
then constitute a “threat” of force because there is the potential to use the 
same vulnerability at a later time to initiate an attack? While it is not likely 
that simply identifying a vulnerability that has been used for intelligence 
collection would ever constitute a threat of force on its own, perhaps the 
combination of an identified vulnerability and other intelligence 
information that shows the likelihood of a future attack would be able to 
constitute a threat of force.  
C.  Cyber Exploitation and Anticipatory Self-Defense Under 
 Current Laws 
Similar to the question of whether cyber exploitation can ever 
constitute a threat of force is the question of whether a nation can ever act 
out of anticipatory self-defense because of cyber exploitation. While, as 
with the two previous sections, cyber exploitation by itself seems like it 
would never justify a targeted nation’s use of anticipatory self-defense, the 
threat of cyber attack that is posed by the vulnerabilities accessed in cyber 
exploitation might in some cases justify its use.  
As explained in Oppenheim’s International Law, the factors that must 
be present in order for anticipatory self-defense to be appropriate are: (1) 
the immediate threat of attack; (2) the urgent necessity to defensively act 
against the attack; and (3) that no practicable alternative to self-defense 
exists.74 Furthermore, it is requisite that the act of self-defense is 
appropriately limited in scope to that which is necessary to prevent the 
infringement.75 Because of the requirement that the threat of attack be 
immediate,76 simply recognizing an accessed vulnerability would not seem 
to be enough to justify the use of anticipatory self-defense. Under this legal 
regime, the only instance in which cyber exploitation would appear to ever 
justify anticipatory self-defense is in the case where both (1) a cyber 
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exploitation vulnerability that can be used at a future date is located and (2) 
where intelligence information that the particular vulnerability will in fact 
be used for an imminent attack has been obtained. 
VI. NEW LAWS FOR CYBER THREATS: CYBER EXPLOITATION AS 
ESPIONAGE? 
In order to account for cyber threats, specifically cyber exploitation 
and its ability to easily lend itself to cyber attack, there needs to be a new or 
amended set of international laws. If the same legal regime continues to be 
used, the consequences could be dire.  
Many of the considerations that the new laws should take into account 
are the difficulties discussed previously with applying LOAC and the UN 
Charter to cyber threats: the new governing laws need to take into 
consideration that today’s society is heavily reliant on an infrastructure that 
is controlled by information technology, that cyber weapons are easily 
available and can easily be used by nonstate actors, that conflict is not just 
between nations and national military forces anymore, that military and 
civilian sectors are interconnected and share information technology, that 
cyber exploitation is different from traditional espionage, and that the 
actors of cyber attacks often cannot be identified. 
The rest of this Note is primarily discusses how cyber exploitation 
should be treated differently than traditional espionage. The capabilities of 
cyber technology simply differ too much from those of traditional 
espionage, and the ease with which the technologies for cyber exploitation 
and cyber attack can be used together demands a new set of laws. 
A.  Espionage Generally 
According to West’s Encyclopedia of American Law, espionage is 
“[t]he act of securing information of a military or political nature that a 
competing nation holds secret,” and it is “commonly known as spying . . . 
.”77 As stated previously, federal criminal laws prohibit the practice of 
espionage,78 but it is a generally accepted activity in the international 
community.79  
 
                                                                                                             
77.  WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 72, at 299.  
 78.  18 U.S.C. § 793 (2006). 
 79.   WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 72, at 299. 
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B.  Differences Between Cyber Exploitation and Traditional 
Espionage 
While cyber exploitation falls within the above definition of 
espionage, as it is a means of obtaining secret national information, cyber 
exploitation does not fit the traditional understanding of espionage, where 
nations send attachés and spies in order to gather intelligence 
information.80 Because cyber exploitation is so much more intrusive than 
traditional espionage and can be conducted effectively by nonstate actors in 
ways that can undermine a targeted nation’s infrastructure or launch an 
attack on another nation, it needs to be treated as a higher concern than 
traditional espionage. A 2009 investigation into a series of Chinese cyber 
exploitations targeted at Tibet is an example of some of the differences 
between cyber exploitation and what this Note refers to as traditional 
espionage.81 
The Information Warfare Monitor conducted an in-depth investigation 
of cyber exploitation against the Tibetan community, which was allegedly 
carried out by China.82 The exploitation was carried out by a “malware-
based cyber espionage network” referred to as GhostNet.83 The GhostNet 
system directed infected computers to download a Trojan, gh0st RAT.84 
Once downloaded, exploiters gained complete, real-time control of the 
computer, allowing them to search and download files, as well as covertly 
operate attached devices such as microphones and web cameras.85 
 1. Access to Much Larger Breadth of Material 
One reason cyber exploitation should be treated differently than 
traditional espionage is because of the greater breadth of material that cyber 
exploitation can provide access to. The more knowledge about a foreign 
nation that can be obtained, the more dangerous that information can 
become. In the case of GhostNet, the research team found “insecure, web-
based interfaces to four control servers.”86 Those interfaces then allowed 
the exploiters to receive data from compromised computers, of which there 
were at least 1,295 in at least 103 countries.87 Even more important, is the 
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81. See generally Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Syber Espionage Network, 
INFORMATION WARFARE MONITOR, Mar. 29, 2009, http://www.nartv.org/mirror/ghostnet.pdf 
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 83. Id. at 5. 
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fact that around 30 percent of those infected computers were “high-value,” 
including: 
[T]he ministries of foreign affairs of Iran, Bangladesh, Latvia, 
Indonesia, Philippines, Brunei, Barbados and Bhutan; embassies of 
India, South Korea, Indonesia, Romania, Cyprus, Malta, Thailand, 
Taiwan, Portugal, Germany and Pakistan; the ASEAN (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations) Secretariat, SAARC (South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation), and the Asian Development 
Bank; news organizations; and an unclassified computer located at 
NATO headquarters.”88   
Such massive amounts of data could not easily be gathered through 
traditional means of espionage, and the number of people, time, and 
resources needed to obtain that much data through the use of spies and 
other traditional means would have been exorbitantly higher.  
 2. Much Easier and Less Expensive Access  
Partly mentioned above, GhostNet is a great example of how easy and 
inexpensive it can be to conduct such extensive networks for the purposes 
of exploitation. As stated in the summary of the investigation into 
GhostNet, “[GhostNet] demonstrates the ease by which computer-based 
malware can be used to build a robust, low-cost intelligence capability and 
infect a network of potentially high-value targets.”89  
 3. Unknown Effects, Spread to Unintended Targets 
While the problem of unintended consequences is often discussed in 
relation to cyber attack, cyber exploitation can also have unintended 
consequences.90 Although the exploitation may begin with a very specific 
target, because of the way computers become infected and then perpetuate 
the infection in order to gain access to more vulnerabilities and more 
computers, the exploitation can often end up infecting unintended targets 
and producing unintended results. The research team investigating 
GhostNet stated that the fact that so many high value targets were identified 
in GhostNet was likely coincidental, “spread by contact between 
individuals who previously communicated through e-mail.”91 
 4. Attribution Is Near Impossible 
Even at the end of the long investigation into GhostNet, the analysis 
never revealed who is in control of GhostNet, what the motivation behind 
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GhostNet was, how to accurately characterize the network, or even what 
data exactly has been exploited.92 Because control of some of the infected 
computers has been traced to China, the most obvious explanation would 
be that the Chinese state has exploited these high profile targets for military 
and strategic-intelligence purposes. However, because of the uncertainty 
surrounding the cyber realm, acting on that assumption would be very 
dangerous.93 
 5. Long Time to Investigate, Few Conclusive Answers  
Furthermore, because of the problems of attribution, investigations 
into cyber exploitation can go on for years and result in very little 
conclusive information. For example, with GhostNet, Tibetan groups first 
reported being targeted from servers in China back in 2002.94 In 2005, a 
member of the investigation team began collecting and archiving samples 
of the payloads and the social engineering used.95 Beginning in 2008, the 
whole investigative team began analyzing those samples.96 Despite all this 
work, as stated above, the investigation team has not been able to 
conclusively find the actor(s) involved, determine the motivation, or find 
out what data has been compromised.   
VII. CONCLUSION 
One difference between cyber exploitation and traditional espionage 
that the GhostNet example does not illustrate is the ease with which cyber 
exploitations can be equipped to carry out cyber attack. This difference, 
combined with the reasons discussed previously, help illustrate how much 
more threatening cyber exploitation can be compared to traditional means 
of espionage. Because of this, cyber exploitation should not be treated the 
same as traditional espionage, and it should, even by itself, in certain 
instances be able to constitute a “threat or use of force.” And in those 
instances when cyber exploitations do not rise to the level of “threat or use 
of force,” which would likely be the majority of cases, those exploitations 
should largely be prohibited on the international level, not just criminalized 
by nations.  
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